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Mrs Foster and the rebels:  Irish unionist approaches to the Easter Rising, 1916-
20161 
 
 
I 
 
At the beginning of 2016 the then First Minister of Northern Ireland, the Democratic 
Unionist Party’s (D.U.P.) Arlene Foster, declined to attend the centenary 
commemorations for the Easter Rising in Dublin.  Mrs Foster subsequently relented 
slightly. She remained clear, however, that she would not be associated with any 1916 
event which could be construed as anything other than interrogative.  
 
The year 1916 has been long and conventionally viewed in the historiography as a critical 
divide in the story of modern Ireland with the different Irish communities looking to 
different episodes, the Easter Rising and the Somme, in terms of the formation of their 
respective national and state identities.  It is, of course, true that since the 1980s, and in 
particular since the cease-fires (1994) and Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern 
Ireland, this binary has become much less oppressive.  The First World War has been 
rediscovered by the Irish state and nation, and though the Somme certainly retains a 
particularly unionist cultural inflection, other killing fields such as Messines (where the 
Irish peace tower has stood since 1998) have emerged as shared commemorative spaces, 
and indeed as symbols of reconciliation.  But, while some tacit agreement has been 
reached between the peoples of Ireland on the issues of killing, or being killed by, 
Germans in the early twentieth century, their mutual slaughter remains much more 
difficult territory. Though the Easter Rising has been revisited and to a considerable 
extent redefined for each Irish generation, and though in 2016 the embrace of the 
commemorations was widened as never before, northern unionism has remained 
                                                          
1  Early versions of this paper were delivered to audiences at Churchill College, 
Cambridge, the University of Westminster and Boston College in March and April 2016.  
A later draft was delivered as the Learned Society of Wales lecture at the University of 
Aberystwyth’s 1916 event in September 2016.  I am most grateful to Eugenio Biagini, 
Patrick Smylie, Oliver Rafferty S.J., and Paul O’Leary for their invitations and 
comments.  
profoundly unconvinced.   
 
Does unionist hostility accurately reflect a marmoreal historical verity? Does the 
depiction of uniformly hostile responses, a default position in the historiography, fully 
capture the nuances of the available evidence? Part of the purpose of this essay is to 
revisit the relationship between unionists and 1916 over the longue durée, and to argue 
that this has sometimes been more ambiguous and layered than the First Minister’s stand 
in 2016, and other recent reactions, generally suggest.   
 
There was certainly not much ambiguity or stratification in Mrs Foster’s case.  
Interviewed by the Impartial Reporter newspaper in Fermanagh, she was very clear that 
she saw no moral (or any other) equivalence between the Irish sacrifice on the Western 
Front and the Irish sacrifice in Dublin on Easter Week. Furthermore, she continued, the 
Rising was by definition an armed attack on ‘the state to which I owe my allegiance’.2 
Her view, of course, chimes with the wider unionist position that the Irish sacrifice in the 
First World War was part of a morally elevated global struggle.  In this – Fosterian – 
reading, the insurgents were, in contrast, ‘egotistical’ and ‘had no democratic backing’:  
they saw the war largely in terms of instrumentality and opportunity.3   
 
But, while accepting the clear predominance of this critique in 2016 and in earlier years, 
it is also important to understand that in fact different Unionists at different times viewed 
Easter 1916 in perceptibly different ways. This reflection seeks to establish the main 
features of the unionist narrative of the 1916 Rising, as well as the central themes of eye-
witness and other accounts:  it examines the ways in which unionist commentators tried 
to interpret the Rising through gradually evolving types of wider contextualization.  It 
sets out evidence pointing to some rarely observed personal and intellectual affinities 
between unionists and rebels in 1916.  At root, this article seeks to explore the 
relationship between unionism and Irish identity.   
                                                          
2 Rodney Edwards, ‘Arlene Foster:  I won’t be associated with 1916 Easter Rising 
Events’, Impartial Reporter, 7 Jan 2016. 
3 Rodney Edwards, ‘1916 Rising leaders were “egotists”, Arlene Foster says’, Irish 
Times, 31 March 2016 
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At present it does not seem likely that the Rising (despite the wide embrace of the 
Proclamation and the diversity of the casualties during Easter week and the sensitively 
handled calibrated official commemoration in 2016) will provide any easy basis for 
agreement, in the way that the killing fields of the Western Front have come to do.  But 
this is very far from saying that Mrs Foster’s intellectual and political inheritance offers 
only an adamantine negativity.   
    
 
II 
 
The Unionist narrative of 1916 was swiftly established through the party press, with 
publications such as the Weekly Irish Times Sinn Féin Handbook or (to a lesser extent) 
the Irish Life Record of the Irish Rebellion playing an important role.  These identified a 
distinctive narrative which laid emphases on the ultimate British military victory, as well 
as on episodes such as the killing of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (D.M.P.) Constable 
James O’Brien at the gates of Dublin Castle, the ambushing of the ‘Gorgeous wrecks’ 
volunteer corps in Mount Street, and the killing of George Playfair at the Magazine Fort, 
Phoenix Park.  In addition to this there were numerous civilians who either kept diaries of 
the event, in some cases publishing these, or who otherwise commented on the events of 
Easter week in the years immediately afterwards:  Fearghal McGarry has rightly 
emphasized that one of the distinguishing features of this narrative genre was that (for a 
variety of social reasons) it was disproportionately unionist.4  Its contributors included 
well known Dublin figures like the Trinity College luminary, John Joly, the high court 
judge, John Ross, and the Dublin-based Ulsterman, St John Ervine. Provincial 
perspectives were offered by the Antrim schoolmaster, Robert Robson, and by the poet, 
‘Moira O’Neill’ (Nesta Skrine), resident in Wexford in 1916, but possessing strong 
associations with Antrim and Kildare.   
 
More substantial contemporary, or near-contemporary. contributions, were offered, for 
                                                          
4 Fearghal McGarry, The Rising: Ireland 1916, (Oxford 2016), p.202 
example, by the Dublin-born Irish Times journalist, Warre Bradley Wells (‘by birth and 
breeding a high Tory’), together with a friend, the pseudonymous ‘N. Marlowe’ (in fact 
the protestant cultural nationalist, Joseph Maunsel Hone), in their instant History of the 
Irish rebellion of 19165 - a work which confessedly dwelt on the ‘mechanisms’ of the 
Rising, seeking to understand its origins and drivers.6  A more tendentious and 
foundational document was perhaps Walter Alison Phillips' 1923 Revolution in Ireland 
1906-23 which influenced a succession of subsequent unionist commentators and 
memoirists, including Henry Maxwell and St John Ervine.7  Phillips was an English-born 
European historian, who embraced Irish unionism, and who (though remembered now 
principally for his dyspeptic narrative of the revolution) in fact contextualized Irish 
events within the wider continental European arena which was his scholarly anchorage 
(he wrote at length on, in particular, the Congress system and on Austro-Hungary).8  
Henry Maxwell (whose Ulster was right (1934) was produced with the cooperation of the 
Unionist party) subsequently set out an influential series of arguments addressing the 
accusation that the unionist militancy of 1912 had delivered both German as well as 
separatist aggression in 1914 and 1916.9 St John Ervine (1883-1971) emerged as one of 
the high priests of literary unionism through his biography of Craigavon: Ulsterman 
(1949).10 This, however, was only after a highly complex political maturation, which took 
him from his familial loyalism through Fabianism and cultural nationalism, and from the 
backstreets of east Belfast through the Pooteresque world of insurance clerking to the 
Abbey theatre and the western front and then back to the metropolitan literary world.11 A 
key figure in terms of unionist apologetics, Ervine’s relationship with the 1916 Rising 
was always characterized by the most intense personal engagement as well as complexity. 
                                                          
5 Warre B. Wells and N Marlowe, A history of the Irish rebellion of 1916 (Dublin, 1916) 
6 Warre B. Wells, An Irish apologia:  some thoughts on Anglo-Irish relations and the war 
(Dublin, 1917) pp. 5, 60. 
7 Walter Alison Phillips, The revolution in Ireland (London, 1923).  
8  See for instance, Walter Alison Phillips, Modern Europe, 1815-99 (London, 1903). 
9  Henry Maxwell, Ulster was right (London, 1934). 
10 St John Greer Ervine, Craigavon: Ulsterman (London, 1949). 
11 Patrick Maume, 'Ervine, St John Greer', in James McGuire and James Quinn (ed), 
Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009). 
(http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a2943).  Among Ervine’s other 
notable works were Four Irish plays (Dublin, 1914); Changing winds (Dublin, 1917); 
Parnell, popular edition (London, 1928). 
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III 
 
But of course there was a social, spatial and temporal spectrum of unionist reaction, 
ranging from the local and immediate through to the kinds of more scholarly reflection 
essayed by Alison Phillips. It is possible to systematize these reactions in different ways, 
identifying possible distinctions between northern and Dublin unionist comment, the 
variegated responses of political leaders, the changing parameters of contextualization as 
well as (even) the evidence of some tentative affinity between unionists and rebels.  But, 
the essential issue is, in effect, that the varieties of unionism produced a variety of 
responses.   
  
Given the geographical confines of the Rising, Ulster unionist eye-witness accounts are 
relatively unusual.  However, the professedly ‘Presbyterian and Unionist’ schoolmaster 
from Doagh, County Antrim, R.B. Robson found himself passing through Dublin during 
Easter Week – en route to the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation annual conference in 
Cork.  His autobiography of 1935 recounts his experiences in eventually escaping back to 
Belfast, and is defined very much as an adventure tale (‘I was involuntarily concerned in 
some very exciting incidents’.)12   His narrative, however, emphasizes both the touristic – 
or voyeuristic – aspects of the Rising, as well as the chivalrous behavior of the few rebels 
whom he directly encountered (Easter Rising tourism is in fact an underreported theme, 
but recurs in the literature – including in Mrs Hamilton Norway’s published letters 
(Norway 1916, p.67)13.  There is an international dimension:  though imperial troops 
were used against the insurgents (including in the defence of Trinity), Robson’s account 
strongly suggests that some rebels drew a distinction between these and the regular 
British army:  he recounts the experience of an Australian soldier in uniform who,  
encountering an armed Volunteer in Sackville Street, was firmly but politely told that he 
                                                          
12 R.D. Robson, Autobiography of an Ulster schoolteacher (Belfast, 1935), p.111. 
13 Norway Hamilton, The Sinn Féin rebellion as I saw it (London, 1916) p. 67. 
should return to his hotel.14  This vignette, incidentally, chimes with the testimony of 
Dublin unionists, who spoke of the determined courtesy of the insurgents whom they 
encountered.   
 
The poet Moira O’Neill also had some northern anchorage, and indeed made her name 
through her collections of verse on the glens of Antrim.15  But she had connections 
throughout Ireland and the empire, and in 1916 she and her family (including her 12 year 
old daughter, who later gained fame writing as M.J.Farrell and Molly Keane) were 
resident at Ballyrankin, Wexford; from there O’Neill contributed a coruscating narrative 
of the local insurgency to Blackwood’s Magazine.  There is little by way of ambiguity in 
her essay, which bristles with anger and outrage:  the insurgent leaders ‘cannot feel 
disgrace.  They reverse every principle of civic decency and their glory is their shame’16 
(O’Neill 1916, p.819).  Where other unionist observers often tended to reflect poignantly 
on the youth of the insurgents, for O’Neill this was a hallmark of irresponsibility:  ‘any 
worthless young woman who wanted some excitement put a Red Cross on her sleeve and 
rushed off with a raiding party taking a revolver as a nursing outfit’.17  Above all, O’Neill 
was outraged by the overturning of conventional social hierarchies, and by the new (if 
temporary) empowering of those whom she despised as ‘tramps and tinkers’.18   
 
But the majority of unionist eye-witness accounts emanate, predictably enough, from 
Dubliners.   One of the most striking themes of the array of work which has been 
produced from the Bureau of Military History documentation (by, for example, Fearghal 
McGarry) is the emphasis on the determined normality of some aspects of life in Dublin 
during Easter Week; and this, as it happens, is also a central theme in the memoirs of 
Dublin unionists.  For these Dubliners, ‘normality’ is perhaps linked with a determination 
to be seen to be unfazed by duress, and is connected in turn with some of the conventions 
                                                          
14 Robson, Autobiography, p.113. 
15 Most notably, Songs of the Glens of Antrim (Edinburgh and London, 1900) and More 
Songs of the Glens of Antrim (Edinburgh and London, 1921). 
16 Moira O’Neill, [Nesta Skrine], ‘During the rebellion in Wexford’, Blackwood’s 
Magazine, cxcix (June 1916), 819-27, p.819. 
17 O’Neill, ‘During the Rebellion in Wexford’, p.825. 
18 O’Neill, ‘During the Rebellion in Wexford’, p.822. 
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of popular military and colonialist literature.  John Ross recorded that the weather of 
Easter week 1916 was 'like summer' and that he sat in his south Dublin garden 'reading 
Plutarch ... notwithstanding the sound of machine-guns and cannon'.19  The conjunction 
of the unremarkable with the abnormal is a motif of his reminiscences:  he recalled, for 
example, a telephone call from a lady guest at the Shelbourne which was accompanied by 
the 'weird noise of a machine-gun in the hotel pouring bullets on the insurgents in St 
Stephen's Green'.20  Godfrey Day, Church of Ireland vicar at St Ann's in central Dublin, 
'seemed to be utterly impervious to any sense of danger, and went about as if nothing 
much were amiss'.21  Provost Mahaffy of Trinity, which was a target for the insurgents, 
walked in his garden 'with perfect quietude of manner', and chirpily told his lunch guests 
(against the backdrop of gunfire) that 'we are making history'.22  On Tuesday 25 April he 
acted as returning officer for the University of Dublin constituency, and then 
nonchalantly supervised a group of junior sophisters who had braved the gunfire to attend 
an oral examination.23  Mahaffy’s great apprehension in all of this was evidently, not so 
much the overturning of union and empire, as that Pearse ‘aspired to usurp the 
Provostship of Trinity’.24 
 
A striking aspect of these narratives is often (what might be defined as) a sympathetic 
ambivalence towards the insurgents.   John Joly, an extremely eminent Trinity physicist 
and geologist, and originally from Queen's County (Offaly), was fired by his brief 
engagement with military life, and indeed wondered (in the light of all of the excitement) 
whether his scholarly career had been ‘a grand mistake’.25  Like many of the republican 
insurgents, Joly quickly came to view his military experience in primal or visceral terms:  
this was not just a matter of catharsis (‘I was now a more contented individual than I had 
been for weeks’), it was also a question of semi-religious comradeship (‘I felt as if we 
                                                          
19 Sir John Ross, The years of my pilgrimage:  random reminiscences (London, 1924) 
p.264.  
20 Ross, The years of my pilgrimage, p.265. 
21 R.R. Hartford, Godfrey Day:  missionary, pastor and primate (Dublin, 1940) p.94.   
22 W.B. Stanford and R.B. McDowell, Mahaffy:  a biography of an Anglo-Irishman 
(London, 1971) p.229. 
23 Stanford and McDowell, Mahaffy, p.231; cf Ervine, Changing winds, p.545. 
24 Warre B. Wells, Irish indiscretions (London, 1923) p.110. 
25 James Joly, Reminiscences and anticipations (Dublin, 1920) pp.223-33. 
were back in those apostolic days when men had all things in common’) as well as deep 
moral ambiguity (‘I can vouch for the deeply enjoyable nature of looting operations’).26 
Like other southern unionists, Joly drew a set of distinctions between the rebellion and 
the rebels, and between the architects of the Rising and its (often young) footsoldiers.  
Like Moira O’Neill, he was generally struck by the youth of the volunteers, though for 
Joly this fuelled sadness rather than outrage:  he ‘reverently’ encountered the body of a 
republican despatch rider who ‘looked quite young; one might almost call him a boy.  
The handsome waxen face was on one side concealed in blood.  Poor boy - what crime 
was his?'.27  
 
Alison Phillips, also writing from a Trinity perspective, applied the distinction between 
leaders and led in the opposite way, contrasting the chivalric commanders of the Rising 
with the violence which they had unwittingly unleashed:  ‘it is not to be supposed that the 
young idealists who were the nominal leaders of the rebellion all approved of this 
butchery – at the headquarters in the Post Office British officers were held prisoners and 
treated kindly enough – but they had unloosed forces which they were unable to 
control’.28  Warre B. Wells also commended the ‘fine courage’ of the insurgents, as well 
as (in general) their ‘clean’ fighting:  ‘nor could the rebels in general fairly be accused of 
rapine’.29  They were rather ‘idealist’, and (whatever its bloody demerits) ‘no echo was 
heard in the rebellion of old sectarian feuds’.30   
 
Similarly, the septuagenarian Dublin Quaker businessman, Frederic Pim, squarely 
condemned the Rising, while acknowledging that its (otherwise deeply mistaken) leaders 
‘were imbued with attractive aspirations and a genuine sentiment of the elevating effects, 
moral and spiritual, of political independence and republican self-government’.31  Once 
again, their respect for property was singled out for commendation:  ‘there was no 
                                                          
26 Joly, Reminiscences, pp.231-2, 260. 
27 Joly, Reminiscences, p.235.   
28 Phillips, The revolution in Ireland, p.99. 
29 Wells and Marlowe, A history of the Irish rebellion of 1916, pp.150-1. 
30 Wells and Marlowe, A history of the Irish rebellion of 1916, pp.66-7. 
31 Frederic W. Pim, The Sinn Féin rising:  a narrative and some reflections (Dublin, 
1916) p.15. 
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making hay of the furniture and armaments such as would have been done by the German 
army in a like situation … they endeavoured throughout to maintain discipline’.32 John 
Ross, looking back on the Rising from 1923-24, remembered above all the courtesy of 
those rebels whom he had directly encountered - including those who had occupied his 
offices in the Four Courts building, but who had left his papers, books and judicial robes 
largely untouched. Ross, like other middle-class Dubliners, was acquainted with some of 
the leading insurgents (the intimacy of Dublin society, much-emphasised elsewhere, was 
not confined by religion or politics); and in particular he was familiar with the work of 
the three poets, Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett, whose execution he explicitly 
deplored.33 
 
The interconnection between the insurgents and Germany reinforced the moral ambiguity 
in the line propagated by (in particular) these southern Unionists.  On the one hand 
unionist journals such as the Dublin-based Irish Life were keen to point out the 
treacherous continental European linkages of both Sir Roger Casement and Joseph 
Plunkett.34  On the other hand, taken as a whole, ‘the leaders were men of a high and fine 
intelligence of the purest and most unselfish motives with whom love of Ireland, the love 
of Ireland, the Ireland of Emmet and Fitzgerald and Wolfe Tone, of Mitchel and 
Stephens, ingrained by the teachings of their childhood had been fostered and developed 
into a passionate devotion comparable only to that of the early Christian saints who 
sought martyrdom as the most desirable of all things’.35  
 
Moreover, while Dublin unionists and (for a time) Dublin opinion generally was 
antagonistic towards the rebel ‘stab in the back’, some of the influences shaping the 
nationalist perspective were also relevant within unionism.  In particular, it should not be 
assumed that the unionist experience of the crown forces was one of uncomplicated ease.  
For example, while Francis Sheehy Skeffington and the dead of King Street were by far 
the most controversial victims of the British campaign, the scurrilous loyalist journalist, 
                                                          
32 Pim, The Sinn Féin rising, p.7. 
33 Ross, The years of my pilgrimage, pp.270, 269. 
34 Irish Life, ‘Record of the Irish rebellion 1916’, p.14 
35 Irish Life, ‘Record of the Irish rebellion 1916’, p.12 
Thomas Dickson, now largely forgotten, was killed alongside Sheehy Skeffington by 
Captain J.C. Bowen-Colthurst; and Skeffington’s capture occurred when Bowen-
Colthurst grenaded and raided the tobacco shop of a Unionist alderman, James Kelly.36  
The sometimes peremptory or threatening behaviour of gun-wielding British troops was 
seen elsewhere as ‘true Germanism’ by offended Dublin loyalists (just as the behaviour 
of nervous young British squaddies on the streets of 1970s Belfast also sometimes 
alienated northern loyalists).37  Even the highly measured Warre B. Wells noted that the 
crown forces ‘seemed to be much more jumpy than their opponents … [and] to this cause 
was due most of the excesses which admittedly occurred in connection with the 
suppression of the fighting’.38 
 
 
IV 
 
What of the responses of unionist leaders to the Rising? The Ulster unionist politician and 
polemicist, Ronald McNeill (who was parliamentary private secretary to Edward Carson 
for a time), emphasized that ‘in Ulster the rebellion was propagated with mixed feelings’, 
and identified two obvious main modes of response.  There was certainly 'horror at the 
treacherous blow dealt to the Empire while engaged in a life-and-death struggle with a 
foreign enemy'; but in addition he highlighted a more complex set of reactions, asking 
'was it unpardonably Pharasaic if there was also some self-glorification in the thought 
that Ulstermen in this respect were not as other men were?  There was also a prevalent 
feeling that after what had occurred they would hear no more of Home Rule, at any rate 
during the war'.39  
 
For his part, Carson was relatively silent or subdued in the aftermath of the Rising, and 
Mrs Wilfrid Spender provides a memorable vignette of him in May 1916 bunkered in his 
Belgravia home at Eaton Place, bombarded with abusive and threatening correspondence, 
                                                          
36 Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: the Irish Rebellion (London, 2005) p.193 
37 Townshend, Easter 1916, p.271. 
38 Wells, Irish indiscretions, pp.63-4. 
39 Ronald McNeill, Ulster’s stand for union (London, 1922) pp.244-45. 
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and occasionally under physical attack (with bricks through his windows, for example).  
Shock is well-established as a theme in the literature on responses to the Rising; but 
silence and evasion (though less recognized) are also important as motifs.40   
 
Carson's key preoccupations had shifted after 1914 - so that by 1916 his concerns were  
not so much national as international – not so much Ireland as the prosecution of the war:  
his response to the Easter Rising was determined largely by these wider, global, 
questions.  In 1915-16 Carson's parliamentary political base was the Unionist War 
Committee, a backbench body designed to secure a more energetic prosecution of the 
war; and indeed it was an issue of global strategy - the protection of Serbia - which had 
chiefly precipitated Carson from the first coalition government onto the backbenches in 
September 1915.  Ireland at this time was important primarily in so far as it affected the 
British and Allied war effort.   
 
The progress of his thought is recorded in the pages of Ian Colvin's biography. Echoing 
his secretary, Ronald McNeill,  his ‘first thought, when I heard of the rebellion, was "that 
is the end of Home Rule"'.41  In addressing the House of Commons on 3 May, after the 
resignation of Birrell, Carson (thinking perhaps about the emerging suggestion that 1916 
in Dublin was rooted in 1912 in Belfast) emphasized that the Rising 'had nothing to do 
with either of the political parties in Ireland'.  As might have been predicted, he called for 
‘an example which would prevent a revival’, but – less predictably – went significantly 
further than this: 
while I think that it is in the best interests of that country that this conspiracy of 
the Sinn Feiners [sic], which has nothing to do with either of the political parties 
in Ireland, ought to be put down with courage and determination, and with an 
example which would prevent a revival, yet it would be a mistake to suppose that 
any true Irishman calls for vengeance. It will be a matter requiring the greatest 
wisdom and the greatest coolness, may I say, in dealing with these men, and all 
that I say to the Executive is, whatever is done, let it not be done in a moment of 
                                                          
40 H. Montgomery Hyde, Carson: the life of Sir Edward Carson (London, 1953) p.401.  
See also Adrian and Sally Warwick Haller, Letters from Dublin, Easter 1916:  Alfred 
Fannin’s diary of the Rising (Dublin, 1995), p.9, where Fannin’s ‘sustained tone of 
detachment’ is stressed. 
41 Ian Colvin, Life of Lord Carson vol. iii (London, 1936), p.162. 
temporary excitement, but with due deliberation in regard both to the past and to 
the future’.42 
 
Later in May this sensitivity was again exposed, when Carson reiterated that the war was 
the key issue:  'since this dreadful calamity came upon Ireland, I have found great 
difficulty in restraining my own feelings, as regards the attacks that are daily made and 
the challenges made daily in the Press. Whenever I feel inclined to answer, I always say 
to myself, "Remember, there is a war going on which our country is engaged"'.43  In 
short, a combination of the war, together with a strong sense of strategy and of history, 
alerted Carson to the political challenges lurking in the immediate aftermath of the Rising 
- and significantly tempered his responses.  
 
 
V 
 
How did other early unionist commentators contextualize the 1916 Rising and wider 
revolution?  As has been noted, the most thoughtful and the intellectually most ambitious 
of the early unionist interpreters of the revolution was Walter Alison Phillips, whose 
well-known The Revolution in Ireland, 1906-23 (1923), was cast (as was earlier work) in 
a variety of subtle continental European contexts. Writing on modern Europe in 1903, 
Phillips was drawn to comparing Ireland with the Austro-Hungarian empire, observing 
for example that ‘the nationalist movement in Bohemia was at the outset largely due to 
the antagonism between the Czech laboring classes and the German capitalists as that in 
Ireland has found its main sustenance in agrarian grievance’.44  For Phillips, 1916 and the 
subsequent insurgency against British rule in Ireland was ‘not in its nature local or 
isolated.  It is but part of the revolution which has been in progress to a greater or less 
degree everywhere – and the lessons it teaches are of universal application.  That is one 
reason why this book bears the title not of ‘The Irish Revolution’ but of ‘The Revolution 
                                                          
42 Hansard 5 (Commons), 82, c. 39, 3, May 1916. 
43 Colvin, Life of Lord Carson vol. iii, p.165. 
44 Phillips, Modern Europe, p.6. 
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in Ireland’.45  1916 was thus linked of course with German war ambitions, and Phillips 
scathingly dismissed separatist arguments comparing ‘the lot of Ireland under the British 
unfavourably with that of Belgium or Poland under the Germans’.46  The subsequent Irish 
revolution, in Phillips’ calculation, ‘gave a unique opportunity for the sinister forces 
which from their centre in Russia were plotting the dissolution of civilization in every 
quarter of the globe … all the materials were to hand for the subtle foreign brains, which 
were plotting the dissolution of Ireland as a necessary step towards the destruction of 
Great Britain and the Empire’.47 For Phillips the Irish revolution, beginning in 1916, was 
self-evidently part of a wider international threat to British civilization.   
 
For St John Ervine, on the other hand, who was present in Dublin during Easter Week 
1916, who knew some of the protagonists, and who was one of the most prominent 
unionist commentators on the Rising, the key frameworks for judging the event were 
ultimately supplied not just by the two World Wars but also by the empire.  Ervine 
himself not only took a global view like Phillips - he was also embedded in various Irish 
literary and political networks, and was much influenced by Bernard Shaw's Fabian 
socialism, and by the centrist political positions embraced by the agrarian reformer, 
Horace Plunkett.   
 
Ervine served in 1917-18 as a junior officer in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and was badly 
wounded:  he believed for a time that the war effort would serve to unite young Irishmen 
of unionist and nationalist backgrounds, and believed too that the younger generation 
could achieve amity where their fathers and mothers had so conspicuously failed.  In this 
sense, the 1916 Rising threatened a key set of his political hopes and aspirations for Irish 
unity:  ‘the Easter Rising in Dublin distressed … all who had hoped that in France the 
Irish soldiers would form a new union that would utterly surpass the old'.48 
 
But, Ervine’s most lengthy and explicit statement on the Rising was published in 1949 as 
                                                          
45 Phillips, The revolution in Ireland, p.xi. 
46 Phillips, The revolution in Ireland, p.114. 
47 Phillips, The revolution in Ireland, p.286. 
48 Ervine, Craigavon, p.311. 
a lengthy digression in an otherwise extremely choleric and discursive life of Lord 
Craigavon; and a key point of reference was the Second World War:  'can comparison be 
made between Ireland, under the British in 1916, and Poland, or any other occupied 
country, under the Germans in 1940?'49 The answer was of course an emphatic negative - 
and inspired one of the most highly emotive passages in Ervine’s writing:  'let those who 
feel inclined, like John Dillon, to rave about the suppression [of the Rising] in a "sea of 
blood", count up the innocent dead in Poland, the innocent dead in Norway, the innocent 
dead in Holland and Belgium, the innocent dead in Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia and 
Greece, none of whom had wrought the slightest harm to Germany, and then enquire of 
their consciences if their inclination has any basis in justice or honest belief'.50  
 
But, in the end, as for so many Irish and British unionists of the period, a reference point 
for judging Ireland was supplied to Ervine by the wider Empire, and in particular the 
Union of South Africa.  Successive unionists saw the creation of the Union as a triumph 
for British imperial statesmanship, and as a demonstration of the reconciliation which 
was possible in Ireland.  For Ervine the British response to the Rising, while 
comprehensible and proportionate, was – even in his highly embittered state in 1949 - 
deeply unwise; and 'the way had been shown in South Africa when De Wet's rebellion 
there was suppressed in 1914' (and when only one execution had taken place).  'Can we 
not doubt that this was the wise way?'51   
 
Of course South Africa was also a natural point of comparison for nationalist critics of 
British government in 1916.  Louis Redmond-Howard argued that ‘there can be little 
doubt that if Castle rule had prevailed in Pretoria as it still does in Dublin, South Africa 
would long since have been a consenting party to German occupation’.52  The Catholic 
Bishop of Limerick contrasted the executions of the leading insurgents in 1916, with the 
lenient treatment meted out to the Jameson raiders by the Transvaal and British 
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governments.53  For a broad section of Irish opinion, then, including even strident Ulster 
unionists, the qualities of statesmanship which had been displayed in the reconstruction 
of southern Africa had emphatically not been deployed in Ireland. 
 
 
VI 
 
Were there ever any sympathies binding the unionist and rebel perspectives?  Both Eoin 
MacNeill (in his well-known An Claidheamh Soluis article, 'The North Began' (1913)) as 
well as Patrick Pearse famously lauded the actions of the unionists in 1913 in creating an 
armed force in the north of Ireland.  Generally, these remarks have been taken to indicate 
that the Ulster Volunteer Force supplied a model to militant separatists; but their wider 
significance has not been pursued.  It is possible to probe further than hitherto by asking 
not only how unionists responded to the Easter Rising, but also by posing the seemingly 
counter-intuitive question - were there wider overlaps between militant separatists and 
unionists in these years at the beginning of the 20th century? 
 
This might at first look set to be a markedly short discussion.  There was, however, a 
quiet intellectual tradition of unionist engagement with separatism which found 
expression even (perhaps particularly) in the – for unionists - foundational work of E.A. 
Freeman and A.V. Dicey.  Each of these Oxonians ultimately argued the case for union 
(Freeman supported Gladstonian home rule for a time), but saw some circumstances in 
which separation would be the least worst option for Ireland, Britain and the wider 
Empire.  Freeman was one of the key intellectuals strongly critiquing Isaac Butt's 
proposals in July 1874: in an article 'Federalism and Home Rule' in the Fortnightly 
Review Freeman argued that a federal system might be supported if it tended to greater 
union, but not if it were a step towards separation:  'I am inclined to think that total 
separation would be a lesser evil than such a scheme of federation, or whatever it is to be 
called, as is now proposed'.54 A.V. Dicey inherited this distinction, arguing, like Freeman, 
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that if 'the strict enforcement of ordinary law and strict protection for legal rights' became 
unworkable in either a union or federal state, 'then, tho with the greatest regret, I shd 
advocate separation'.55    
 
These were emphatically not detached intellectual preferences.  Instead, they formed a 
covert - if exasperated - theme within the discourse of some senior unionists.  In March 
1908 John Atkinson wrote to Walter Long that 'it is a delusion to suppose that a desire for 
Imperial Supremacy with Home Rule is a law of the being of the Irish Protestant. If I 
were a young man, and Home Rule were carried, I'd join Sinn Féin and advocate 
separation, and a republic with all the power that I possess - not from pique or a sense of 
wrong, or a feeling of having been deserted or betrayed - that's the English delusion'.56  In 
speaking with Blanche Dugdale (Arthur Balfour's niece) in 1928, Carson denounced what 
he saw as the dishonesty of the Irish Free State settlement, arguing that 'I think there'd be 
more decency in a Republic than in this humbug.  In fact I'd rather see a republic'.57  This 
strain within unionist political thought may help to explain some of the wider ambiguities 
of response to 1916:  however much they repudiated separatism, for some unionists it was 
at least intellectually and emotionally comprehensible.     
 
Of course a long-standing part of the analysis of some Home Rulers - such as J.J. Horgan, 
writing in a Complete Grammar of Anarchy (1919) - was precisely the fact that unionists 
were in reality disloyalists, and that their attachment to the British crown and the wider 
British connection was in fact utterly tenuous.  Horgan dedicated his pamphlet to 'those 
members of the Unionist party, in and out of the House of Commons, who may wish to 
find out for themselves whence it is that the Sinn Féin movement in Ireland has drawn its 
example, and who may have the curiosity to trace to at any rate one of their sources 
certain symptoms of revolutionary unrest in Great Britain, Egypt and India’.58  
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It was not only embittered Redmondites who thought along these lines: some southern 
unionists, and some unionists in western Ulster also argued that 1916 was effectively 
born out of the reckless, disloyal and transnational militancy of eastern Ulster in 1912-14.  
The southern Irish Church of Ireland clergyman, Godfrey Day, was vicar of St Ann's 
Church in central Dublin during the Rising, and, while he 'deplored' that event, he also 
saw clearly 'the dragon's teeth that were sown by the gun-running at Larne'.59  The 
Donegal-born Presbyterian lawyer and unionist MP, James Rentoul, wrote that 'there is 
little doubt that the present condition of affairs all over Ireland [in 1916] is the direct and 
inevitable outcome of the threats and drilling and arming in Ulster.  It is almost incredible 
that those who held up the police at Larne, cut the telegraph wires, landed German guns 
at dead of night, publicly dared and defied the British Government, and practically 
boasted of their "treason", did not foresee the aftermath of "Easter Week" in Dublin ...'.60   
 
These were charges which were allied to the more comprehensive Redmondite accusation 
that 'the Ulster crisis' and the associated threat of civil war helped to encourage German 
militarism and therefore the onset of war.  Indeed, a central set of arguments for many 
Home Rulers during and after the First World War was that 'Carsonite' militancy, and the 
threat of civil war in Ireland, had helped to persuade the Germans that the British would 
be unable to offer full resistance; and that Carson was thus an architect of the apocalyptic 
slaughter of 1914-18.   As Father Robert O'Loughran (a Queenstown priest) wrote in 
1918, the British democracy 'realised then, as the world does now, that Carsonism was 
not only leading to civil war in Ireland, but, worse still, to an European massacre'.61  
O'Loughran developed this analysis in other directions, arguing that Carson's humiliation 
of the Asquith government before the War had so alienated American opinion that they 
held off from offering support to the British:   'both Carson's attitude preceding the war, 
coupled with England's atrocities of Easter Week, 1916, should have utterly disgusted the 
free and liberty-loving Americans of British hypocrisy and tyranny ... Carsonism kept 
America two-and-a-half years out of this war of civilisation'.62  Equally, 'America might 
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have rushed to the Allies' help two year before she did, only for Carsonism'.63  Denis 
Gwynn, writing somewhat more cautiously in 1932, could still argue that 'much evidence 
suggests that the German Foreign Office counted upon the menace of civil war in Ulster 
as the chief reason why England could not interfere', while also acknowledging German 
interest in the Irish Volunteers.64   
 
One of the most eloquent exponents of this analysis was Louis Redmond-Howard.  
Writing sympathetically on Casement, Redmond-Howard argued that both he and the 
Irish Unionist leader Edward Carson were bound into a long-standing Irish framework of 
European reference:  ‘Sir Edward Carson had introduced a new principle into Irish 
politics – or was it merely the same as that of Owen Roe O’Neill and Wolfe Tone? … 
after intimidating the Nationalists with the fear of the English army, they [Carson and his 
Unionists] began to intimidate the English army with the fear of the Germans’.  
Casement, in this sense, was merely inheriting and adapting a set of European 
engagements prefigured by Carson who in turn was drawing upon more ancient Irish 
historical precedents.65 
 
Of course various unionist apologetics strove to tackle these questions about the 
relationship between Carsonism and 1916.  The most substantial of these was Henry 
Maxwell’s Ulster was right (1934) – and it was Maxwell who, writing in the Craigavon 
era, constructed the most lasting and influential defence of the unionist moral high 
ground in relation to 1916.  He argued (like Redmond-Howard) that 1916 was not created 
by 1912, but that each had a longer gestation in Irish history:  'to suggest that in Sir 
Edward Carson's Volunteers there was any new principle unknown to Irishmen or that 
they in any way opened up fresh possibilities to insurrectionists must surely be a 
misconception'.66  He also argued (with some contemporary justification in fact) that 
Carson’s leadership and robust governance of unionist militancy effectively guaranteed 
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order rather than the reverse:  'it is all very well to say that the Ulster Volunteers paved 
the way to the effective disorganisation of disorder ... it must not be forgotten that, but for 
the [Ulster] Volunteers, it is almost certain that disorders of so serious a nature would 
have broken out in 1914 that it may very well be that England would not have been able 
to take the part she did in the Great War'.67   
 
Moreover, Maxwell sought to dispose of the Home Rule accusation that unionist 
militancy had not only delivered Pearse but also Kaiser Bill:  ‘yet another accusation 
which is levelled against Carsonism from time to time, is that the paralysis which it 
threatened to the British Government was the signal for Germany to declare war ... a 
much better signal would have been the inevitable chaos and ruin which would have 
resulted throughout all Ireland, but for the inspiration of restraint which Carsonism 
created directly in the North and by example and imitation in the South'.68   
 
In fact contained within Maxwell’s vigorous unionist apologetics, especially in terms of 
its analysis of the role of Carsonism on the eve and in the early years of war, was an 
implicit acknowledgement of some areas of overlap between demotic unionism and its 
nationalist counterpart.  St John Ervine, a magnificently unsentimental observer of 
popular unionism in Belfast, identified a strain of scepticism about Carson’s rather too 
efficient delivery of his followers into the ranks of the British army and from thence to 
the trenches.  Similarly, the unionist author Hugh Shearman argued (in 1942) that 'in July 
1916 a terrible thing happened ... the Ulster leaders did their best to tide over that crisis 
with brave words but the lesson of the war sank in.  A profound distrust of the British 
Army and British efficiency and a cynical determination not to be fooled again remained 
in Ulster minds.  It has remained there to this day ...'.69   
 
This point is worth emphasizing in terms of the prevailing binary relating to 1916:  in the 
first years of the war, unionists did not automatically celebrate the blood-letting on the 
                                                          
67 Maxwell, Ulster was right, p.158. 
68 Maxwell, Ulster was right, p.159. 
69 Hugh Shearman, Not an inch:  a study of Northern Ireland and Lord Craigavon 
(London, 1942), p.150. 
Western Front, but instead in some cases both recoiled from the slaughter and threatened 
reaction against their political leadership.  Shearman’s observation is telling, partly 
because it comes from a unionist perspective, and partly because he was writing in the 
midst of the Second World War, when one might have expected a more crudely patriotic 
default position.  In fact it should come as no overwhelming surprise that, just as Irish 
nationalists were sceptical about their leadership and the war effort, so too were some 
Irish unionists:  moreover, it seems clear that most Irish people, nationalist and unionist, 
had a healthy desire to stay alive, despite the best efforts of their respective leaders, 
unionist, Home Rule or republican.   
 
One last area of consideration in terms of possible affinities between unionism and the 
insurgents rests with the area of class politics – and in particular with the low-key 
admiration of some unionists for James Connolly (despite the latter’s bracing critique of 
unionism).  Bryan Ricco Cooper, a former unionist M.P. and Sligo landowner of 
increasingly progressive political beliefs, and - like St John Ervine - much affected by the 
war, wrote of his veneration for Connolly in an unpublished history of 'Ireland under Sinn 
Féin':  'Conolly [sic] was probably the greatest man whom Ireland has produced in the 
present generation ... his great soul gave to the Dublin labourer a noble inspiration and a 
hope of better things'.70  Warre B Wells, similarly, devoted a lengthy section of his 
memoir of the revolutionary years to a highly sympathetic treatment of Connolly.71 
 
Ervine himself, otherwise suspicious of the Rising, was of course leftist in his politics at 
the time, being a prominent Fabian.  Ervine was also bound to one of the most prominent 
martyrs of easter week, Francis Sheehy Skeffington, and indeed was walking in his 
company on 26 April 1916 a few hours before his death at the hands of Captain Bowen-
Colthurst.   Sheehy-Skeffington was, in Ervine’s assessment,  'an honourable and upright 
man, very cranky indeed, but possessed of moral courage far beyond the majority of men.  
And he was likeable'.72   
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Ervine produced portraits of several of the revolutionary leaders in his novel Changing 
Winds (1917).  Henry Quinn, the hero of the narrative, much admires the labour leader 
Mineely, who (as even his surname suggests) is a thinly disguised Connolly:  ‘if the 
employers hadn’t behaved so brutally over the [Dublin] strike, Mineely might have 
become the solvent of a lot of ill-will in Ireland; but they made a bitter man out of him, 
and I suppose it is too late now’.73  Quinn is close friends with, and has been taught by, a 
Gaelic League activist, John Marsh, who turns out in 1916, and is killed in the fighting in 
O’Connell Street:  Quinn laments the apparent futility of Marsh’s actions, while admiring 
his passion (‘”by God”, said Henry to himself, “I wish I had the heart to feel what he 
feels”’).74  Marsh’s death in battle is defined in exactly the same terms of nobility and 
futility as the deaths of Quinn’s English friends, Gilbert and Ninian, who had fallen on 
the Western Front (‘each in his own way had died finely’).75  Overall the representation 
of the Rising is highly ambiguous:  incomprehension about the insurgents’ attitude 
towards death (they ‘have a contempt for death that I can’t understand.  I loathe the 
thought of dying …’) is mixed with complaints about the dead hand of the older 
generation of failed politician, some negativity about Catholicism, and a clear admiration 
for the rebels’ core honesty and selflessness.76   
 
 
VII 
 
What of more recent unionist perspectives on the Rising?  David Trimble, writing in 1992 
- and before his election as Ulster Unionist leader - devoted a 37 page pamphlet to the the 
Easter Rebellion.  Strikingly, Trimble's parameters - after 70 years of partition and over 
20 years of violence in Northern Ireland -  were somewhat more constricted than those of 
Ervine, being more Irish, more local, and less global.  His tone was much less emotional, 
however, and - unusually for a political pamphlet – he drew on the work of a range of 
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scholars, admittedly those who were sometimes critical of aspects of the Rising and its 
protagonists (Ruth Dudley Edwards on Pearse, David Miller on church and state in early 
20th century Ireland, Father Francis Shaw on the meaning of 1916).   
 
Trimble was markedly calm and measured in discussing the events of Easter 1916, and 
the protagonists of the Rising, reflecting (it has been observed) his amateur passion for 
military history – but also a longer tradition of restrained or even grudgingly admiring 
unionist comment on the insurgents’ courage.77  In any event this was a serious set of 
reflections, and by no means close-minded:  even Martin Mansergh, a highly influential 
figure within Fianna Fáil in the Haughey, Reynolds and Ahern years, was cautiously 
impressed.78 
 
However, Trimble was also critical of other aspects of the Rising, and his critique has 
simultaneously summarized and elaborated a particular set of Ulster unionist convictions 
relating to 1916.  Trimble emphasized that the Easter Rising was 'suffused with religious 
symbolism' to the extent that, unusually for an historic event, the dates of its 
commemoration follow Easter itself rather than the calendar dates beginning Monday 24 
April 1916.79  He emphasized, too, that 'the rebellion of 1916 enshrined the concept of the 
blood sacrifice - that the violent actions of a few could redeem the nation'.80  He 
acknowledged that 'it is perhaps understandable for the citizens of the Irish Republic to 
see the 1916 Rebellion as an event which changed history and led to the creation of their 
state.  It must, however, be remembered that before 1916 the British government, through 
the Home Rule bills, had conceded the principle of self-government; all that was now at 
stake was the range of powers and the geographical extent of the new entity'.81 
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For Trimble, the Rising’s legacy was fundamentally problematic, though he was careful 
to draw a clear distinction between the actions of the 1916 leaders and the wider Fenian 
tradition which they represented but also partly spurned:  'the legacy of 1916 is anti-
democratic, as the rebels considered that they required no mandate - a view contemptuous 
of democracy and constitutional norms.  The tragedy is that this view appeared to be 
vindicated by events and now appears to legitimise similar action.  That this was not 
necessarily an element in Irish republicanism can be seen from the IRB constitution ...'.82   
 
Moreover, Trimble viewed (what he saw as) the heavy-handed or insensitive 
commemoration of this ‘anti-democratic’ legacy as wholly disastrous, especially in terms 
of Northern Ireland:  '1916 had a particular legacy for the North, as the 50th anniversary 
of the rebellion started the destabilisation of Ulster'83.  This is in fact a key point in 
understanding subsequent unionist approaches:  1916, in this influential exegesis, was not 
just about the safely distant history of the neighbouring state, it was also interlinked with 
the contemporary history and experience of Northern Ireland.  In 1966 the relatively 
liberal (if otherwise limited) unionist prime minister of Northern Ireland, Terence 
O’Neill, identified himself with the tradition of comparatively pragmatic and relaxed 
unionist responses to the 1916 Rising outlined elsewhere in this essay - only to have his 
tolerance challenged by an enraged populist loyalism, mobilized by Ian Paisley.  Just as 
Paisleyite fundamentalism threatened both O’Neill together with the oxygen and space 
required for cool and calm reflection in 1966, so too the continuing relevance of the 
Rising in the North, and the ongoing challenge from irreconcilables, have each limited 
the options of subsequent unionist leaders.  In this sense Trimble – and Foster – are closer 
to the divisive passions immediately engendered by the Rising than some ostensibly less 
distant commentators.   
 
But, for Trimble, 1916 was not just about the enflaming of sectarian and political tensions 
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in the North, it had also more directly damaging implications both for the Irish state and 
also, if inferentially, for reconciliation and unity on the island itself:  'the ideology of 
1916 obscures Ireland's British heritage, of which the war dead from what we would now 
call a Nationalist background are but a symbol.  That heritage is still pervasive 
throughout the Republic; but by being unable to acknowledge and accommodate it, Irish 
Nationalists are doing violence to part of their own heritage and the need to suppress and 
deny that heritage may help to explain the continuance and virulence of their hatred of 
things British in general ...'.84   
 
At no point in his analysis did Trimble address the arguments, made not just by Home 
Rulers, but also by some unionists in the south of Ireland and south and west of Ulster 
that the northern mobilisation in 1912-14 supplied some of the inspiration for the 
insurgents of 1916 (he mentioned Eoin MacNeill's  and Pearse's acknowledgement of the 
inspiration of the Ulster Volunteers, but did not chose to consider the implications of 
this).  It is also clear that ‘the war dead from what we would now call a Nationalist 
background’ have – in the years since Trimble’s work on 1916 was completed – been 
belatedly rediscovered by the Irish state, and more generally by Irish nationalism, and 
their sacrifice properly recognized.  Whether this re-envisioning of Ireland’s relationship 
with the First World War means that, for Trimble, ‘the ideology of 1916’ has in fact 
changed either in content or impact is unclear; but it is at least possible to draw this 
inference from his reasoning.   
 
 
VIII 
 
The unionist relationship with 1916 was always more complex than current political (and 
indeed scholarly) portrayals might suggest, including those by Mrs Foster in 2016.  There 
was unquestionably deep and lasting unionist antagonism, and a sense of betrayal in the 
midst of wartime adversity.  On the other hand, rebellion and rebels have often been 
distinguished within this history of unionist reaction:  criticism of the Rising has 
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frequently been tempered by respect for the courage and chivalry of its leaders.  More 
generally, there were muted if consistent personal sympathies within the genre, often with 
James Connolly (the width of Connolly’s embrace has been confirmed by renewed 
interest in his Bangor-born secretary, Winifred Carney of Cumann na mBan, who was 
married to George McBride, an Orange loyalist, and veteran both of the Ulster Volunteer 
Force and 36th Ulster Division).  Nor should the possibility of a limited degree of 
ideological engagement or understanding be wholly dismissed:  it is, after all, sometimes 
said (even by unionists themselves) that ‘the essential feature of Ulster unionism is that, 
whatever it is, it is not unionist’.85  The unionist framework of reference in judging the 
Rising has never been static, but has instead shifted from the First to the Second World 
Wars via the Russian Revolution, and has also involved imperial analogy:  there are in 
fact grounds for seeing that framework as narrowing, in the long aftermath of partition, to 
Northern Ireland itself, with readings of 1916 which bitterly emphasise 1966 and 1969.  
These, indeed, are the particular contexts for Mrs Foster’s remarks.   In short, while there 
have been some persistent motifs, there has been no single established Irish unionist 
critique of the Rising. 
 
All this is clearly not the stuff of which peace towers are built.  But it might perhaps 
cause future unionist ministers to pause and reflect on their options when next they 
receive an invitation to a commemoration of the Rising. 
 
Moreover, as a final thought it is possible even to interrogate – or at any rate to 
complement - Yeats’s famous claim on the back of Cathleen ni Houlihan that his drama 
had ‘sent out certain men the English shot’.  Seán Connolly, one of the Abbey Theatre 
actors, and an officer in the Irish Citizen Army, was killed on Easter Monday 1916 at the 
Dublin City Hall.  Connolly’s last performance at the Abbey was in Yeats’ Cathleen ni 
Houlihan, and his final appearance on stage was at Liberty Hall in a patriotic melodrama, 
‘Under which Flag?’. 
 
St John Ervine’s play, ‘The Orangeman’, produced in 1914, addresses his preoccupation 
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with the inter-generational tensions besetting Ireland, both in terms of Catholic and (in 
this case) Protestant society. The one act drama depicts John McClurg, an east Belfast 
loyalist, who is beset with rheumatism and who is unable to sustain his family’s tradition 
of beating the Lambeg drum.  His son, Tom, represents a new departure in the life of the 
family, refuses to take his father’s place, and – in a symbolically charged act - ultimately 
destroys the iconic drum.   One of the most aggressively sectarian of the play’s characters 
is Andy Haveron, a man cankered by his attachment to union and empire (as Connolly 
would have seen it).  In the first and subsequent runs of the play, at the Abbey Theatre, 
beginning in March 1914, Haveron was played by Connolly.   
 
Ervine, the once and future unionist, was manager of the Abbey in 1915-16, and had a 
famously fraught relationship with the Abbey troop – yet he was almost certainly the last 
poet and dramatist to see the actor alive.86  On Easter Sunday 1916 Ervine watched 
intently while Connolly had paraded with his company:  ‘the captain … was a man I had 
known slightly, a modest quiet man of honest desires called Sean Connolly … I nodded 
to him and he waved his hand to me.  The next day he was dead, killed in the street 
fighting for some ideal that had dominated and bound his mind …’.87  
 
In several senses, then, Ervine sent out ‘certain men the English shot’.  But so, too, 
perhaps, did Irish unionism itself.   
 
 
 
 
Alvin Jackson, 
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